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Abstract  
In this paper we critically review recent developments in policies, practices and 
philosophies pertaining to the mediation between science and the public within the 
EU and the UK, focusing in particular on the current paradigm of Public 
Understanding of Science and Technology (PEST) which seeks to depart from the 
science information-transmission associated with previous paradigms, and enact a 
deliberative democracy model. We first outline the features of the current crisis in 
democracy and discuss deliberative democracy as a response to this crisis. We 
then map out and critically review the broad outlines of recent policy devel- 
opments in public-science mediation in the EU and UK contexts, focusing on the 
shift towards the deliberative-democratic model. We conclude with some critical 
thoughts on the complex interrelationships between democracy, equality, science 
and informal pedagogies in public-science mediations. We argue that science and 
democracy operate within distinct value-spheres that are not necessarily consonant 
with each other. We also problematize the now common dismissal of information- 
transmission of science as inimical to democratic engagement, and argue for a 
reassessment of the role and importance of informal science learning for the ‘‘lay’’ 
public, provided within the framework of a deliberative democracy that is not 
reducible to consensus building or the mere expression of opinions rooted in social 
and cultural givens. This, we argue, can be delivered by a model of PEST that is 
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Recent developments in the modes of public-science mediation and the shift 
towards public engagement with science and technology are situated within the 
intersection of a number of distinct developments that are largely extrinsic to the 
policy and practice of public-science mediation.1 These include the ascendancy of 
the constructivist pedagogic paradigm in educational theories and practices; 
attendant developments in science education (which value inquiry, questioning, 
argument and the relevance of everyday knowledge); the development of a certain 
(to some degree media-induced) social phenomenology of a risk society; the effect 
of the cultural(ist) turn in received outlooks on science and technology; and— 
perhaps most importantly—the crisis of liberal democracy. Amid the current 
ambience of public-science mediation, what has not received enough scrutiny is 
the complex set of interrelationships and tensions between and amongst 
democracy, equality (formal and substantive) and science. We believe that more 
reflexive assessment should focus on the complex interrelationships between what 
are in essence discrete and arguably in some ways incommensurable ‘‘value-
spheres’’, in Weber’s sense (2004). These spheres are structured around three 
distinct sets of organizing principles: the distinct principles and practices of a) 
popular sovereignty and self-government; b) the need for and entitlement to the 
distribution of scientific knowledge as a symbolic resource; and c) science as both 
a social institution and the epistemic matrix for truth-values that are irreducible to 
the determinations of the social institution that science is, or to the subjectivities or 
even intersubjectivity of scientists as a ‘‘community’’. The sidelining of any 
sustained thematization of the interrelationships of these complex and distinct 
spheres, it seems, is rooted in an optimistic and now largely consensual view of 
the unproblematic homogeneity of good values; and partly due to a presumably 
anti-elitist and empowering ethic vis-a`- vis the dispossessed and the excluded 
(i.e., excluded from power resources, including techno-scientific knowledge and 
its applications and the decision-making concomitant with their pursuit and 
governance). 
In this paper we critically review recent developments in policies and philosophies 
bearing on public-science mediation in the EU and the UK. Our discussion will 
touch on these framing circumstances where relevant. However, the crisis of 
democracy, its empirical manifestations and its theoretical understanding will 
receive special attention by way of setting the broader scene for the discussion 
1 A clarification of terminology is in order at the start: we will use ‘‘public-science mediation’’ as 
a generic description to refer to the whole field of activities, policies and institutional spaces that 
aim to ‘‘improve’’ the relation between science and the public, irrespective of the paradigm or 
model at work (known as Science Communication, Public Understanding of Science or Public 
Engagement with Science and Technology). Thus, public-science mediation includes the whole 
spectrum of these attempts ranging from what is known as the more didactic approach premised 
on the deficit model to anti-pedagogic approaches that see dialogue as the sole objective such 
activities should aim at.  
of the current policy and practice in public-science mediation in the UK and the 
EU. This special attention is warranted by what we see as the intersection of two 
recent historical developments pertaining to science and democracy respectively: 
on the one hand, the view, codified and manifest in governmental policies, that 
science should not and cannot be seen as a self-sufficient pursuit of self-validating 
knowledge indifferent and transcendent to its social, cultural, political and 
economic determinations as well as effects, intended and unintended; on the other 
hand, the crisis of the liberal representative model of democracy, and the 
consequent need to invent new lines of renewal for democracy, both as critical-
normative idea(l) and as creative praxis. The underlying logic that marries science 
to democracy runs thus: given that in a science-saturated society reasoned opinion-
formation about science is critical to an effective enactment of substantive 
citizenship in a democracy, science and public-science mediation are seen as 
critical to the renewal of democracy and the energizing of its deliberative aspect 
within the politics-oriented dimension of civil society, i.e., the public sphere 
(Habermas 1992). 
This paper unfolds in four steps. First, drawing on the literature in political 
philosophy as well as political sociology, we outline the features of the current 
crisis in democracy and discuss deliberative democracy as a proposed remedial 
move championed in many quarters in political science and political philosophy as 
well as policy-driven democratic reform. Second, we map out and discuss the 
broad outlines of recent policy orientations in public-science mediation in the EU 
context that echo many developments in the disciplinary space known as Science 
and Technology Studies (henceforth STS). Third, we critically discuss key parallel 
policy-driven developments in the UK context that have led to the current 
paradigm in public-science mediation known as Public Engagement with Science 
and Technology (henceforth PEST). We conclude with some critical thoughts on 
the complex interrelationships between democracy, equality, science and informal 
pedagogies in public-science mediation, putting under scrutiny in particular the 
now predominant view of information-transmission of science as inimical to 
democratic engagement, and the underlying axiological adequation predicated of 
the goodness of democracy, the truth of scientific knowledge and the specifically 
social goodness of its technological spin-offs. 
Deliberative Democracy: What is it and What is it for? 
Due to a combination of circumstances and factors, internal and external to the 
political field, there is growing evidence—and recognition—of a serious crisis in 
the existing mode of liberal representative democracy, as a set of institutionalized 
practices and as a normative framework for the business of governance. The 
current crisis relates at once to the sources, processes and ends of the exercise of 
formal political power, and is manifest in many growing symptoms; it has affected 
both the facticity and validity of democracy. On the one hand, it has undermined 
democracy’s foundational claims to enacting popular sovereignty and the 
protection of individual rights; on the other hand, on the ground, it has reduced the 
political process to a technical exercise in the management of public affairs 
(Rancie`re 1995), and simultaneously reduced the specifically democratic 
dimension of the political process to a periodic ballot-casting exercise. Politics as 
management has in turn activated the oligarchic tendencies inherent in democracy 
(Rancie`re 2007). Under these circumstances the paradoxes of democratic 
representation have become pronounced in that representation in effect functions 
in accord with the model of delegation, for those who have made the effort to vote. 
In effect, from the point of view of the majority of the demos, democracy is the 
name of little more than the voting system in place. But even the electoral aspect 
of democracy, taken on its own terms, has not been faring very well, partly 
because voters are positioned as self- interested consumer-citizens and 
statistical/demographic targets, and partly because of the steady drops in election 
turnouts. The failings of the existing mode of liberal democracy are thus located in 
(a) the over-reliance on representation as the means and, to a great degree, also the 
end of the democratic process; and (b) the inherent limits of representation per se. 
In addition to the fact that representation is not co- extensive with or reducible to 
democracy (Rancie`re 2006), representation has its inherent limits that often go 
unthought. It is prone to be reduced to a form of delegation that, as Barber (1984: 
145) notes, disenfranchises the voters and ‘‘alienates political will at the cost of 
genuine self-government and autonomy’’. Further, there is the little noted 
impossibility of a complete fit between the representative’s interests and value-
laden worldview and those of the represented (who will never happen to have one 
uniform set of interests), in addition to the tension between representing 
constituency-level interests versus other interests existing on multiple planes 
(communitarian, national, universal, professional, etc. not to mention the 
personal). In a democracy that is reduced to formal representation functioning as 
de facto delegation, the voter, the citizen qua voter, is, as Barber puts it, free only 
on the day s/he casts the ballot. Even that is questionable in today’s politics given 
the limited range of indistinguishable options available, and the ascendency of 
identitarian politics that trades on—and in a substantial sense contributes to—the 
formation of people’s pre-political ‘‘instincts’’ and ‘‘essences’’, and reduces 
democracy and politics to their public expression and integration. For, as 
Schmitter (1999: 936) notes, among the key defining features of ‘‘real existing’’ 
democracies is a ‘‘fixation with territorial representation and partisan competition 
for providing the only legitimate links between citizen and state’’. 
Nor has the substantive content of democracy been done any favour by the 
convergence politics between the major parties that usually alternate on 
government in Western established democracies, which has created a situation 
where voters have ‘‘on offer’’ what is in effect a very limited range of ‘‘electoral 
choices’’ that correspond to differences in substance. Convergence has only 
aggravated the situation: the rise of style politics and ‘‘spin’’ and the prioritization 
of ‘‘electability’’ as the main visible differentiating aspects of party-political 
formations to make up for the now often hardly perceptible differences in terms of 
distinct policy and value orientations among contending pretenders to power. Even 
if existing democracy were doing well on the electoral front, it would still be in 
need to the same degree of a dimension of democracy as ‘‘political truth 
procedure’’ (Badiou 2006) given that elections-based democratic will and opinion 
are by no means self-validating, and can under some circumstances be the problem 
rather the answer when the only validity they have is that they happen to embody 
the belief of the majority or, worse, the subtle dictates of a pre-political consensus 
mediated by a communitarian ethos of one form or another. 
This has prompted many attempts in democratic theory and even practice to 
formulate alternative models of democracy capable of overcoming the 
undemocratic tendencies of the minimalist liberal model of representative 
democracy. These attempts have a long history and go at least as far back as 
Rousseau in modern times (Rancie`re 2006). And in more recent developments 
over the last three decades or so the search for an alternative mode of democracy 
has taken on different inflections: ‘‘developmental’’, ‘‘participatory’’ or ‘‘strong’’ 
democracy (Goodin 2008: 2); these developments in democratic theory have 
culminated in what is now known as ‘‘the deliberative turn’’ in theories of 
democracy (Goodin 2008; Dryzek 2000). The central claim of the deliberative turn 
is that the failings of liberal democracy and its legitimation deficit can be 
remedied through activating the deliberative dimension of democracy that has 
been sidelined by institutionalized politics. Despite the now already multiple and 
divergent emphases in conceptions of deliberative democracy, there is a core set of 
distinctive normative axioms that, following Parkinson (2006), can be summarized 
as follows: a) the necessity for democracy of reasoning amongst people ‘‘as the 
guiding political procedure’’ (with reasoning opposed to bargaining among 
competing and aggregated interests and private preferences); and b) the publicness 
of the pivotal action in politics: namely, engaging in uncoerced reasoned 
deliberation with other citizens (as opposed to the privateness of voting). Thus, a 
substantive—as opposed to merely formal/procedural—democracy now increas- 
ingly depends on the extent to which informal inputs are obtained from a vibrant 
public sphere where ‘‘mini-publics’’ (Goodin 2008) engage in reasoned 
deliberation within ‘‘the informal public sphere’’—as opposed to ‘‘the formal 
public sphere’’ centred around parliamentary politics (Habermas 1996: 307–308). 
This, it is argued, will provide opportunities for ‘‘opinion-formation’’ and ‘‘will-
formation’’ (Haber- mas 1996) that can supplement those taking place within 
formal parliamentary democracy and make up for their deficiencies, and thereby 
enhance an active model of democratic citizenship. With the deliberative turn, as 
Dryzek (2000: 1) notes, ‘‘democratic legitimacy’’ is now primarily about 
the ability or opportunity to participate in effective deliberation on the part of 
those subject to collective decisions ... The essence of democracy is itself now 
widely taken to be deliberation, as opposed to voting, interest aggregation, 
constitutional rights, or even self-government. 
In other words, democratic legitimacy and a sufficiently legitimated political 
process, as Habermas would argue, now more than ever before depend on 
redressing the balance between system and lifeworld, and engineering local, 
lifeworld-based and lifeworld-oriented deliberative sites where the potential of 
public rationality can be actualized through an open-ended democratic 
intersubjectivity. 
Critical to conceptions of deliberative democracy is thus an anthropological view 
of public life that gives primacy to a certain spontaneous vernacular rationality 
that is both instrument and effect of communication, both the core fact of social 
life and potentially a regulative matrix for the good social life. The deliberative 
turn in democratic theory, to that extent, owes a great deal to Habermas’s 
discourse ethics and his attempt to reground rationality in what he posits as the 
necessary and universal normative core of spontaneous everyday 
communication—and the totality of communication as coextensive with the 
species-being of humans. He thus grounds rationality not in subjective attributes or 
even normal actions of the archetypal individual (of liberal political philosophy), 
but in the communication- dependent intersubjectivity presupposed by every 
experience and enactment of subjectivity. Habermas founds this universal 
rationality on the mundane and (often implicit) validity claims that inhere in every 
instance of communication as an enactment of intersubjectivity: these are claims 
to truth, truthfulness and rightness. For Habermas these are the irreducible and 
necessary validity claims that we all make when we communicate: claims to truth, 
truthfulness and rightness are made every time communication occurs. Even in 
instances of disagreement or deception these claims are not undermined, but they 
constitute the conditions of possibility for making successful deceptive statements 
or for viable disagreement. However, as will be discussed later, unlike Habermas’s 
discourse ethics as the regulative framework for a democracy that consists of what 
he calls action oriented towards reaching agreement/understanding 
(Versta ̈ndigung), the type of deliberative democracy that we will argue PEST 
should be oriented to is one that does not normatively commit itself—in advance 
of the empirical situated singularities—to consensus-building regulated by a priori 
norms that can limit the creative potential and responsiveness of PEST activities. 
In principle, deliberative democracy, we argue, has the potential to go some way 
towards renegotiating the balance of power between the demos and what 
Rancie`re (2007) calls the oligarchic elite of democratic government. Reasoned 
and open deliberation has the potential to embed an interpersonal lifeworld-based 
dimension and act as a countervailing force to procedural macro politics (De 
Greiff 2000). Deliberation can thus enhance a minoritarian politics whose issues, 
concerns and perspectives do not feature on the majoritarian public agenda2: either 
because the statistical majority for some reason or another fails to take on board or 
empathize with these perspectives, or due to the inherent limitations of 
quantitative democracy (including its paradigmatic dispositif of the opinion poll 
which offers surface-level responses within pre-determined templates that can act 
on public opinion, rather than simply ‘‘represent’’ it), or due to the structural 
forces that bear on the democratic process and that, as Dryzek rightly notes, set 
‘‘severe constraints on what is possible in terms of both the content of public 
policy and the degree of democracy that can be tolerated in the state’s production 
of policy’’ (2000: 21). Deliberative democracy will not necessarily empower 
ordinary citizens in the formal-legal sense, but can help people acquire a sense of 
belonging in actu to a civic collectivity—as opposed to an administrative form of 
belonging—as well as acquire knowledge and deliberative skills by virtue of 
engaging in the process. It can contribute to a citizenship competence conceived 
‘‘not [as] a function of state- derived status but rather of learning-through-
participation’’ (Stewart 2002: 482), as opposed to the classical-liberal model of 
citizenship where deliberation/participa- tion ‘‘expresses’’ a pre-political identity 
rooted in socio-cultural membership and the political interests and preferences 
assumed to be consubstantial with the givenness of this membership (Rancie`re 
2007). The deliberative model of citizenship, in contrast, ‘‘proposes that 
participation normatively should and empirically can change or modify 
preferences in relation to perceived and pursued political interests’’ (Stewart 2002: 
476). 
Therefore, citizenship, within the deliberative frame of reference, is no longer cast 
in the mould of what Smith (1997) calls ‘‘ascriptive citizenship’’; it is not 
reducible to, nor even derivable from membership of a political community or of a 
social ‘‘station’’, or even an a priori normative set of traits and qualities. 
Citizenship becomes the name not for a status, set of rights, attributes or qualities 
conferred by the state, but for certain modes of acting in the public sphere. Hence 
2 Here the use ‘‘majoritarian’’ and ‘‘minoritarian’’ has nothing to do with belonging to a 
statistical minority defined according to one axis of ‘‘identity’’ or another, as opposed to a 
statistical majority, though it may coincide with this statistical distribution. We use 
‘‘minoritarian’’ in Deleuze’s sense to refer to ‘‘a non-denumerable set’’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004: 513) or an ensemble that acts and thinks in ways that cannot be classified or accommodated 
into the existing dominant norms of political practice, and thus into the empirical gamut of 
normed political practices. This is what Rancie`re calls the count of the uncounted: ‘‘The people 
[demos] is a supplementary existence that inscribes the count of the uncounted, or part of those 
who have no part—that is, in the last instance, the equality of speaking beings without which 
inequality itself is inconceivable’’ (Rancie`re 2010: 33). 
 
the relevance and potential input of the PEST field into deliberative democracy—
by virtue of PEST’s location within civil society as a cultural milieu that is well-
positioned to incorporate, relay and enhance deliberative democracy as norm and 
praxis. A democratized/democratizing PEST offers the potential to facilitate 
‘‘micro-deliberative forums’’ (Goodin 2008) without seeking to sell one policy 
line or another (which is not to say that PEST can ever be apolitical). This unique 
position as a cultural space autonomous from formal politics and offering people 
the chance to learn about and make an input into politics/policy of science and 
technology through deliberative democracy is a resource that PEST should explore 
to embed itself within local civic spaces and to support the experimental 
development of deliberative democracy. 
However, despite the in-principle substantive value of deliberative democracy and 
PEST’s potential within it, we should not overlook the possible abuses and 
derailments of the deliberative-democratic content of PEST. There are some well- 
founded reservations about somewhat too optimistic views of deliberative 
democracy as an unproblematic good heralding a new impetus for democratic 
organization, without enough attention given to possible distorting effects of 
interest and partisan organizations that can mediate deliberative-democratic events 
(Hend- riks 2006). Thus, a critical and vigilant approach to deliberative democracy 
in and via PEST is needed; one that views deliberative democracy in general, 
including in PEST, as a desirable prospect whose enactment is likely to fall short 
of meeting its hopeful formulation, not least because of the discordances between 
the organizing axioms and conditions of democracy and scientific knowledge, and 
the distinct imperatives they engage: an ethic of open (interpersonal) 
communication (in Habermas’s sense) versus an ethic of (impersonal) truth (in 
Badiou’s sense), however partial and provisional that truth might be, provided it 
offers ‘‘the present- best’’ propositional knowledge (Norris 2005). 
Theoretical debates around deliberative democracy did not go unnoticed by 
political and civil society organizations. There have been many experiments with 
staging public-sphere informal settings where deliberations of mini-publics can 
take place. Examples include: Citizens Juries in the UK and Canada, Planning 
Cells in Germany, the Danish model of the Consensus Conferences and 
deliberative polls, twenty-first century Town Meetings and National Issues 
Forums in the USA. These experiments have involved a mix of organizational 
techniques, including bringing mini-publics together with experts and 
policymakers in weekend forums whose outcomes are widely reported in local and 
national media (especially in the Danish model), with some documented cases of 
influence on policy- and decision-making processes within macro-political 
institutional contexts (Goodin 2008). The UK Government’s Green Paper ‘‘The 
Governance of Britain’’ stresses the necessity for rejuvenating the democratic 
process by embedding debate, deliberation and even decision-making in everyday 
encounters within locally based civil-society contexts to ‘‘foster and harness 
community voices on important issues of public policy’’ (House of Commons 
2007: 48). The policy-driven attempt to develop a deliberative dimension to local 
democracy has been echoed in PEST policies, both across the EU and in the UK. 
The EU Research/Policy Context 
The 2000 Lisbon Agenda announced the EU’s strategy to facilitate Europe’s 
transition into a full-fledged and efficient ‘‘knowledge-based society’’ by 2010 
(Council of the European Union 2000). Science, not surprisingly, is portrayed as 
central to achieving this vision. Underlying this vision seems to be the assumption 
that science, quite apart from its conduct, technological instrumentalization and its 
social consequences, will have happy knock-on effects on public rationality and 
vernacular modes of reasoning and acting (Wagner 2007). The aim is to 
coordinate an EU-wide approach to science, science education and public 
engagement with science, rooted in the premise that science is consubstantial with 
‘‘European modernity’’—assumed to be a pleonasm. There is thus assumed to be 
enough of a deep-seated and latent scientific essence cutting across ‘‘the imagined 
community’’ (Anderson 1991) of Europe to warrant and sustain an EU-wide 
science and public- science mediation policy that transcends country-specific 
peculiarities. The second feature that marks the EU-wide approach is what can be 
described as the relational view of science: steering and engineering ways in 
which science—as both an epistemic and institutional space—relates to a set of 
spheres posited as external to it, such as politics, ethics, the environment and 
economics. This is modeled on the ‘‘science and ...’’ formula: science and society, 
science and education, science and citizenship, science and politics etc.—all of 
which have been major concerns within EU policy contexts. 
The discussion of the EU context will revolve around two major reports to the 
European Commission written by two expert groups whose make-up included 
many leading STS scholars. The Reports aimed to inform the EU science and 
society policies, and to provide a research-validated grounding for them. The 
Reports occupy the intermediary space between an STS-dominated scholarship 
and the EU policies on science-society mediation. The first, entitled Taking the 
European Knowledge Society Seriously (European Commission 2007), was 
produced by the Expert Group on Science and Governance, and the second, 
entitled The Global Governance of Science (European Commission 2009), by the 
Expert Group on Global Governance of Science. Both reported to and were 
commissioned by the Science, Economy and Society Directorate, one of the 
bodies directly under the Directorate-General for Research of the European 
Commission. What is striking about these two reports is that they were written by 
an international team of some leading figures in STS whose names have been 
associated with what can be described as the values-turn or cultural turn in the 
disciplines of the sociology and history of science. 
Taking the European Knowledge Society Seriously (European Commission 2007), 
as the title indicates, situates itself as a continuation of the Lisbon Agenda and 
thus incorporates many of its organizing principles (Council of the European 
Union 2000). The Report also aims to reflect on and depart from the inadequacies 
of previous visions and policies, especially with regard to conceptions of the 
nature and dynamics of scientific knowledge, mediating between science and non-
expert lifeworlds, and the public as a construct. The 2007 Report is driven by three 
major concerns: first, the general unease with science and its products; second, the 
democratization of the governance of science; and third, addressing topical and 
controversial science-related issues. The Report emphasizes the need to address 
the widely felt unease and distrust towards science and the scientific establishment 
against the backdrop of heightened awareness of risks linked to new technology 
products whose invisible effects are yet to be known. This tied in with the broader 
ethos of what Beck (1992) describes as the risk society. The Report sought to 
address the questions and obstacles standing in the way of a more substantive 
public engagement that is not reducible to a legitimating exercise for political 
decisions or for what scientists decide to do. The Report also recognizes the 
inadequacy of existing ways of constructing what is commonly described as the 
‘‘public’’. 
What distinguishes the 2007 Report from previous EU policy documents is a view 
of science that emphasizes the necessity of taking on board the inevitable value-
base of science. It acknowledges how values inhere in all aspects of the conduct of 
science: its funding, planning, governance, the research process, its outcomes, 
applications and impacts on society, all of which are closely bound up with 
‘‘normative structures’’. In parallel, there is a consistent recognition of science- 
related issues that cannot and should not be reduced to technical questions (e.g., 
statistical, impersonal risk assessment exercises), but whose treatment requires 
grappling with the value-base of scientific research, science policy and instrumen- 
talizations of science. There is a sense in which the Report tends to come across as 
a policy manifesto for coming to terms with normative questions by policymakers, 
scientists and science communicators. It calls for ‘‘learning normative 
deliberation’’, in a departure from what is seen as a positivistic linear view of 
science policy and the scientific process, which is built on ‘‘the assumption that 
expert discovery can reveal objective truths, which then determine proper policy, 
and that democratic input is valid only after factual truths have been revealed’’ (p. 
11). It is the view of public engagement with science as an after-the-event affair 
that the Report seeks to depart from by moving public engagement ‘‘upstream’’, 
and by making the process coextensive with the various aspects of scientific 
practices and the institution of science. Public-science mediation is thus no longer 
about ‘‘post-innovation’’, ‘‘downstream’’ or ‘‘output questions’’; it should be 
concerned with the inputs (including normative conceptions of purpose, 
aspirations, needs and priorities of different social and cultural voices and groups) 
that ought to steer scientific research and policy in the first place. 
Overlapping with this principle is an instrumentalist image of science, or more 
precisely a heteronomous view of science: science is no longer seen as an 
‘‘Independent Republic’’, as the Report puts it, that can be, or should be, allowed 
to remain autonomous and indifferent vis-a`-vis the imperatives of its social, 
cultural, political and economic milieu; a rarefied space of knowledge production 
that works best when left to its own autonomous epistemic criteria. Science is best 
seen, according to the Report, as a servant to innovation, the knowledge economy 
and ultimately social and economic well-being. This instrumentalist view of 
science as a heteronomous service/servant reinforces the argument that 
engagement requires more than getting end-users/citizens involved in information-
transmission events and debate either for the sake of lifting the scientifically 
illiterate public out of its illiteracy or for the sake of (deliberative) democracy as 
an end in itself. This view requires that public engagement be moved ‘‘upstream’’ 
to have a formative impact on decision- and policymaking affecting scientific 
research, and to make an input into its governance at all levels and stages and 
maximize relevance and outputs for the public (Wilsdon and Willis 2004). 
How these principled and well-meaning pronouncements can translate into reality 
is left under-explained in the Report. The question of what is to be done when the 
values of science are at odds with the values of democracy also receives little 
attention, because science is denied any values immanent to it. Indeed, 
underpinning the Report, and more generally underpinning the values-turn in 
social and historical studies of science, is the idea that science has no values; that 
there are no scientific values; there are only values driving the conduct of science, 
and thus its ostensible truths. To that extent, values are in effect counterposed to a 
value-free science, a science that has no values of its own. In the Report science 
figures as a terrain receptive and prone to value investments coming from 
without—essentially exogenous values (emanating from the interests of individual 
scientists, scientists as a group, political interests, economics, etc.). With the 
values-turn in science and society policy and research, there are no values of 
science; there can only be values for science. In any case, the Report’s own 
version of the values for science seems to be informed by the legitimacy 
imperative on the part of the powers that be. This drive can be glimpsed in what 
the Report sees as the overriding anxiety arising from public unease with science: 
The place of science, or better, technoscience, as a key agent of governance and 
government, able both to enlighten, and to generate public legitimacy for 
democratic policy commitments, is seen as seriously weakened by this public 
unease. (p. 13) 
With the more recent Report The Global Governance of Science (European 
Commission 2009), the theme of governance takes centre stage more explicitly; 
and thus the emphasis has shifted in some ways: the deliberative slant on public 
involvement with the conduct of science policy is subsumed under the umbrella of 
the governance of science. Deliberative democracy is thus framed as a means of 
managing public affairs—not an end in itself; or, as Negri would argue, as a 
regime of constituted power, and not a dispositif of constituent power (Negri 
2009). The 2009 Report is the as of yet strongest expression of the EU’s advocacy 
of what Irwin (2006) describes as the new scientific governance. The crisis in 
public-science mediation as well as ‘‘the crisis of trust in science’’ are reframed as 
essentially ‘‘a crisis of governance’’. The shift to the language of governance, as 
opposed to government, as Wright (2008) notes, is laden with benign overtones 
embedded within a set of discursive practices that seek to reduce government to a 
minimal orchestrating role vis-a`-vis the good steering of polity without 
government, and eventually of policy without politics. The governance of science 
thus suggests that the conduct of scientific conduct—to echo Foucault—is one that 
involves distributed steering, managerial and participatory mechanisms that cannot 
be seen as concentrated within a central locus of governmental power. The limits 
and possible pitfalls of deliberative governance in science are recognized only to 
be ascribed to the fact that science-related deliberative-democratic engagement 
should be embedded within governance per se. It admits that 
the take-up and success of these deliberative experiments has nevertheless been 
patchy. One clear lesson learned from experience so far is that such initiatives 
need to connect better to real governance decisions. (European Commission 2009: 
27) 
The 2009 Report has reinforced the now official line on science as necessarily 
bound up with values; science not only is traversed by values but can also work as 
ideology—in the strict sense of the term—to obscure normatively structured 
decisions that are presented as technical operations: it is ‘‘often also a vehicle for 
introducing (while obscuring) normative decisions that deserve to be debated on 
their merits’’ (European Commission 2009: 27). 
The crux of the problem follows from collapsing science into science policy. To 
say that the direction of a certain programme of scientific enquiry is shaped by 
interested and ideologically invested policies says nothing about the truth-value of 
the science per se, about the worth of that research based on the values of science, 
in much the same way as the irrational elements of what Popper calls ‘‘the context 
of discovery’’ for a given scientific theory has no implications whatsoever for its 
context of justification (Popper 2002). The Report thus echoes some of the 
currently dominant and overstated views emerging from the STS field: namely, 
science is but a form of ideology or belief amongst others, and its truth-value is a 
function of its dominance and recognition as science (Barnes et al. 1996; Collins 
and Pinch 1998; Knorr-Cetina 1999). This is, paradoxically enough, a fairly 
ideological view of science as it not only oversimplifies the picture to a 
remarkable degree, but also promotes the professional interests of STS players. 
In parallel, the theme of access and inclusion is brought into play, though in 
ambiguous terms. The problem identified is essentially one of a science that lacks 
openness and access—both taken as two constituent features of science. It is, 
however, important to look more closely at the concept of openness that is 
predicated of how science should be conducted. The first thing to note is that there 
are two completely different types of openness that are conflated: what can be 
described as epistemic openness and openness as institutional openness. The 
conflation is quite manifest in the following passage: 
From its eighteenth century origins, the society of science has made claims to 
openness. Science, unlike politics or religion, claims to engage with the physical 
world, to discover the way it really is. It also aspires to be open to membership 
without class, national, religious, ethnic, or sexual prejudice to anyone able to 
undergo the appropriate initiating apprenticeship. Science has, of course, often 
failed to live up to its ideals. It can dogmatically function as an ideology that 
excludes some forms of knowledge. (European Commission 2009: 24) 
Here, there are two exclusions at work that are conflated: a) the institutional 
exclusion, or the exclusion of some (or groups of) people from the institution of 
science; and b) the exclusion of other forms of knowledge, or the epistemic 
exclusion of forms of knowledge or beliefs that are classified and labeled as 
unscientific. The problem is that the two exclusions have little to do with each 
other; the first is socially ‘‘overdetermined’’, the second is scientifically 
overdetermined to the extent that it is an effect of the operation of an axiomatics of 
scientific practice at a given time, which is of course not without its social effects 
as it aims to mark the boundary conditions for the constitution of science as a 
distinct space of human endeavour, and to that extent science as a field in 
Bourdieu’s sense (Bourdieu 2004). Now the point is that the first exclusion can be 
remedied with some form of democratization of the boundary separating out 
science as a social institution, and scientists as a professional interest group, from 
their outside. The second, however, is not necessarily commensurable with 
democratic reason and is in a sense both indifferent and resistant to 
democratization (the more advanced, the less accessi- ble—or what comes down 
to the same: the more advanced, the more exclusive and anti-democratic). The 
development of scientific knowledge has been amongst the most undemocratic 
historical phenomena, especially in relation to non-scientists, with boundaries and 
high entry thresholds, esoteric and formulaic language and, perhaps most 
importantly, the axiomatic opposition—which Bachelard (2001) emphasizes as 
one of the conditions of possibility for scientificity—between science and opinion, 
or episteme and doxa in Plato’s terms. 
The presumption thus is that it is scientific to ‘‘open access to science’’, and if 
science is not accessible, the reasons and causes are to be sought in science as an 
institutional practice as well as the interested investments in science and the 
utilizations of its products. Here we encounter yet another conflation of two 
separate notions of access: access to scientific knowledge per se by other 
scientists, especially located within different national and geo-political contexts; 
and access to scientific knowledge by the public of non-scientists. The Report 
states that: ‘‘economic networks and cultural prejudices have limited participation 
in science among underprivileged groups’’—i.e., have restricted these groups’ 
access to participation in science; this is the first meaning of access, whose answer 
could be the democratization of science as a site within the public sphere, or in 
Balibar’s phrase (2004), as one of the key emerging worksites of democracy. The 
2009 Report immediately goes on to contrast a scientific ideal of openness to the 
existing notion/ practice of openness as defined around access, openness and 
exclusivity in legalistic terms and with reference specifically to intellectual 
property rights: 
Yet the ideal of openness remains a dynamic force that has influenced the 
historical development of the society of science and continues to be manifest in 
such diverse forms as the ‘open society’ of Karl Popper and the open software of 
computer scientists. The concept of open access to scientific knowledge is but 
another peculiarly salient manifestation of a perennial scientific ideal within the 
scientific community. The concept of open access focuses reflection on the issue 
of who controls access to scientific knowledge and by what means. Much of the 
debate takes place around the question of online access to scientific publication in 
an era of ubiquitous information. But of special concern is control of this access 
by legal means that assert some kind of property rights over scientific information, 
normally referred to as intellectual property rights (IPRs). (European Commission 
2009: 24) 
Thus it appears that, arguably, the issue of governance is essentially not one of 
how to democratize access to science and turn science into a worksite of 
democracy, but one along the lines of: given the transnational flows of scientific 
knowledge and information, how can access and openness to scientific knowledge 
be maintained within a binding legal framework that transcends the jurisdictional 
sovereignty of nation-states? How to ensure an enactment of the trade-off between 
the sharing of original knowledge production across national borders in return for 
ensuring patent- related property rights? In other words, far from showing any 
concern with openness in the sense of inclusivity and democratization of 
participation in steering the conduct and effects of techno-science, this aspect of 
governance essentially aims to argue for the necessity for transnational anti-piracy 
policies in return for more liberal yet regulated flows of scientific information. 
This is summed up in the following statement: 
Patent law aims to promote innovation and the rapid dissemination of its 
associated knowledge. The inventor gets exclusive rights to control commer- cial 
exploitation of inventions for some years and in return discloses detailed 
description of the invention, opening up the new knowledge to all. (European 
Commission 2009: 24) 
The Report, however, alludes to yet another aspect of the crisis that underpins its 
vision, which does not sit very comfortably with its view of science as value- and 
ideology-laden: a crisis in deference to science and entrusting oneself to the 
esoteric wisdom of the few knowers; it is stated that ‘‘[t]he loss of deference to 
expertise reinforces the need to construct new models of governance for a more 
sceptical age’’ (European Commission 2009: 27). This is the image of public 
engagement and deliberative governance of science as in some sense the 
management of public skepticism, a crisis-management technique, rather than a 
vehicle for lending some substantive content to the existing hollowed-out version 
of formal majoritarian democracy, and as a means for democratizing science 
policy and affording a space for the performative development of citizenship. 
Deliberative democracy for the governance of science is thus seen as necessitated 
by the ‘‘loss of deference’’, with the brief of making up for this deficit in 
deference to the cultural and social authority of science—as knowledge, as 
application, as an institution and as a service provided by a professional group that 
used to enjoy a great deal of autonomy that had shielded it from public scrutiny as 
well as from a direct instrumentalist calculus, and had bestowed on it a halo of 
deference. 
Despite its confident tone about what ought to be done to democratize science 
policy and governance, the 2009 Report is at pains to reconcile the two distinct 
and competing values of democracy as deliberation and governance as efficient 
well- legitimated management; on the other hand, to reconcile the de facto 
governance of science as inevitably and indeed intractably global, overflowing the 
bounds and jurisdiction of EU both as discrete nation-states and as an integrated 
geopolitical bloc, with the imperative of embedding deliberative democracy within 
the governance of science. It simply notes that ‘‘[w]hat global deliberative 
governance might look like nevertheless remains unclear’’. It thus skates over 
complex issues that relate to a) the universalism of science within the epistemic 
value-sphere (or its strong claims in that regard); and b) the increasing 
subordination of science to technology—to instrumentalizations whose 
production, circulation and consump- tion, driven by global capital, are not 
completely under the control of nation-states or even strategic cross-national 
blocs. The Report then takes the easy way out through the multiculturalist route, 
through some vague reference to the tricky possibility of working out some 
common ground for cross-national/cross-cultural coordination of the governance 
of science. It states: 
Across the world, we can expect such divergences to be magnified. Countries 
outside Europe will have different governance approaches and science in each 
country or culture will fit into different contexts. As science globalises, and the 
need for global governance looms larger, we therefore need to consider some of 
the myriad contexts of global science within global society. (European 
Commission 2009: 28) 
In the recommendations, and specifically in the one that bears directly on what is 
described as deliberative governance, the Report makes it even more ambiguous 
whether the push for deliberative governance is about democratization of science 
policy, or more about a mode of management of science affairs cross-nationally 
that can serve to bring the rising science powers under some multilaterally binding 
regulatory framework. The recommendation goes: 
The European Union should seek to extend to the global level of its leadership in 
working to harmonise the internal and external governance of science across 
national boundaries—by furthering research and discussion on the global 
governance of science and seeking to develop appropriate protocols and their 
application for global collaboration. (European Commission 2009: 43; original 
emphasis) 
Here, there is a concern with mainstreaming the EU’s mission to drive and lead 
international regulation of science as a socio-political institution; there is a 
assumption about ‘‘disharmony’’ regarding the existing modes of governance 
cross- nationally; and there is no explicit mention of deliberative democracy in the 
recommendation; ‘‘discussion’’ is as close as the recommendation gets to the 
notion of ‘‘deliberative governance’’ which was emphatically flagged up in the 
Report, although discussion in the quote above seems to refer to discussion 
between nation- states or between the EU bloc of nation-states and the rest of the 
world. 
The UK Policy Context 
As Bauer et al. (2007) note, from the 1960s scientists withdrew from the media 
while the public was alienated by the domination of science reportage by specialist 
science journalists. Engaging in public science was thought to be not only a time- 
consuming task of little consequence, but also detrimental to a science career—
what matters most are one’s peers’ assessment and recognition. This happened 
against the background, and to a great degree because of, the circumstances of the 
Cold War environment. Bensaude-Vincent (2001) shows how the massive gulf 
between science and the public, and between science and public opinion, is a 
relatively recent thing and is by no means coextensive with the history of modern 
science. She dates the split and opposition between science and (public) opinion to 
the mid- twentieth century dominance of physics, and nuclear physics in 
particular, and the culture of secrecy that surrounded it during the Cold War, 
which alienated the public from science and instituted a distance between science 
and public life. 
The development of PEST has been incremental, and its precursor in the UK dates 
back to the mid-1980s. Since the 1980s policies have attempted to change the 
relationship between science and the public in three ways on the basis of three 
corresponding interrelated principles: first, through attempting to bridge the gulf 
between the scientific establishment and the public to facilitate science literacy; 
second, by ensuring a degree of transparency and accountability to the public with 
respect to scientists’ work; and third, through attempting to ensure that taxpayers, 
as funders for scientific research, are involved in setting the priorities and 
directions for science, leading to both a value-for-money science for the taxpayers 
and securing an element of democratic legitimacy for both scientists and science 
policymakers. 
The Bodmer Report 
The 1985 Royal Society Report The Public Understanding of Science (Bodmer 
1986), known as the Bodmer Report, marked the inaugural formalization of 
policy- sponsored Public Understanding of Science (henceforth PUS) activities in 
the UK (Miller 2001). The Bodmer Report has received ample attention and 
analysis, and still remains a watershed and formative document that ‘‘haunts’’ 
subsequent attempts to follow it or go beyond it. Here, we focus specifically on the 
implications for democracy of the Bodmer approach to the publicity and 
publicness of science, as political, professional and pedagogic practice. The 
Bodmer Report was to define the terms of the debate for the following decade or 
so, and it presented a programmatic vision of what came to be known as the PUS 
paradigm in the mediation of public-science relationships and was followed by a 
flurry of qualitative research from STS scholars exploring and eventually 
condemning the PUS vision (Irwin and Wynne 1996). The link to democracy is 
framed thus: 
In a democracy public opinion is a major influence in the decision-making 
process. It is therefore important that individual citizens, as well as the decision- 
makers, recognize and understand the scientific aspects of public issues ... Wider 
understanding of the scientific aspects of a given issue will not automatically lead 
to a consensus about the best answer, but it will at least lead to more informed, and 
therefore better, decision-making. (Bodmer 1986: 10) 
Weber’s (1978) concepts of legitimation and rationalization are pertinent here and 
useful in unpacking what the Bodmer Report was trying to achieve and where it 
was coming from. The aim was to inform public opinion such that the governance 
of science is better legitimated and rationalized, with the ultimate aim being to 
facilitate the conduct of science. The information is to be fed to both citizens and 
policymakers with a view to legitimating the exercise of political authority over 
the management of techno-science; and simultaneously to policymakers with a 
view to achieving a degree of rationalization of the exercise of authority in 
government and public office. Here, it is arguably the rationalization of politics as 
management of public affairs that is at stake; or the rationalization of democracy 
in so far as it serves as a means of governance. The Bodmer Report, in essence, 
tied in with the 1980s New Right ethos of subjecting public services and publicly 
funded institutions to accountability mechanisms whereby they would have to 
justify their existence and their value-for-money for the public of taxpayers. 
In terms of its pedagogic import and implications, the Bodmer Report states: 
Ignorance of elementary science cuts off the individual from 
understanding many of the tools and services used every day... those 
who have never been stimulated to enquire about how things work 
and who lack the basic knowledge to pursue such an enquiry are 
surely at a disadvantage in the modern world. Scientific literacy is 
becoming an essential requirement for everyday life. (Bodmer 1986: 
10) 
This captures what is now commonly known as the deficit model in PUS. The 
deficit model’s flaws have triggered ample critical analysis (Gross 1994; Miller 
2001); we will therefore limit our discussion to a few observations that will help 
frame subsequent developments that led to PEST. The organizing premise of the 
deficit model is centred around the idea of, as Gross (1994) succinctly put it, 
‘‘public deficiency, but scientific sufficiency’’. We would like to point out two 
key presumptions that will resonate with our subsequent discussion: (a) the 
harmony between distinct and even incommensurable ‘‘value-spheres’’ (Weber 
2004); (b) opportunities to learn about science-for-everyday-life are available on a 
level playing field. The deficit model is built on a series of equations and 
displacements between and across distinct planes that correspond to distinct 
‘‘value-spheres’’. These can be summarized as follows: science is good for the 
public; understanding is what the public needs to latch on to the goodness of 
science as well as its truth- value and to make science democratically sustainable. 
Therefore, PUS as a remedial formula is predicated on the presumption that 
understanding science (epistemology) and capturing its goodness and potential 
contribution to well-being (consequentialist ethics) will result in both respect and 
love for science (affectivity) and its legitimation (politics). Equally important, 
another premise of the deficit model which does not seem to have received enough 
attention—exemplified in the quote from the Bodmer Report above—is the 
presupposition that scientific knowledge is readily available to everybody on equal 
footing, and that most people do not make enough effort to find out and engage in 
some form of self-directed literacy necessitated by their existence in a society 
where the products of technoscience are pervasive. It is built on an equal-
opportunity model of access to science; and an implicit explanation of scientific 
illiteracy as self-exclusion or apathy towards the existing science learning 
opportunities. 
The 2001 House of Lords Report Science and Society 2000 (PSCST 2000) was 
commissioned and published in response to the science scandals and the attendant 
legitimation crisis of scientific research and policymaking (Felt and Fochler 2008). 
These created the initial impetus for mainstreaming public-science mediation into 
government policy with a view to democratizing science policy and countering the 
communication crisis in the wake of the BSE and GM crops debates (Irwin 2006). 
Science and Society attempted to reframe science as a value-driven enterprise 
populated by scientists and policymakers who have their own values which should 
be acknowledged and brought into debate. However, what it has in common with 
the Bodmer Report is its conception of the role of science in society: science as an 
instrumentalist project to be submitted to an assessment primarily in terms of its 
utility. In parallel, the Report is underpinned by the idea that in British society 
science and technology have permeated every aspect of people’s everyday lives, 
whilst science is linked, rightly or wrongly, to actual and potential disasters. 
Therefore, public engagement with science should become integral to the 
substantive content of active citizenship as individuals’ participation in the 
democratic process requires the ability to arrive at informed reasoning and 
judgement about science-related issues; just as it requires scientists to be party to 
the dialogical process whereby opinions about science are negotiated and formed. 
The Report is premised on a view of the historical trajectory of the relation 
between science and the public in many ways akin to the historical accounts of 
Bensaude-Vincent (2001), Weigold (2001) and Logan (2001) who argue that the 
gulf between science and the public is a recent thing. The Report notes: 
The golden age of popular science was surely the Victorian era, when Faraday 
lectured at the Royal Institution and the Great Exhibition led to the establishment 
of the national museums in South Kensington. (PSCST 2000) 
The mainstreaming into government policy of promoting more democratized ways 
of increasing the public understanding of science was driven by the 
communication crisis, confusion and even misinformation surrounding, amongst 
other science related issues, the BSE and GM crops debates throughout the 1990s, 
which aggravated to a considerable degree the climate of mistrust by the public 
towards the scientific establishment and the science policymakers (Irwin 2001; 
Miller 2001). Public mistrust creates a legitimation crisis for both the scientific 
establishment and the government in a representative, liberal democracy; it throws 
into crisis the legitimacy claim of the rationality of what Habermas (1970) 
describes as the ‘‘scientization of politics’’ whereby policymaking processes 
become subordinated to the wisdom of a handful of unelected experts who 
indirectly determine policy orientations from a presumably interests- and ethics-
free standpoint. The Report thus states: 
[P]ublic confidence in scientific advice to Government has been rocked by BSE; 
and many people are uneasy about the rapid advance of areas such as 
biotechnology and IT—even though for everyday purposes they take science and 
technology for granted. 
The values-turn in science policy articulated in Science and Society 2000 clearly 
relayed into policy some key arguments coming from STS-type constructivist and 
sociological approaches to science (Irwin and Wynne 1996; Irwin 2006). 
However, what it has in common with the Bodmer Report is its conception of the 
role of science in society: science as an instrumentalist project to be assessed 
primarily in terms of its utilizations (rather than its self-referential epistemic 
criteria of its distinct value-sphere). The crucial differences between Science and 
Society and the Bodmer Report lie in the former’s take on the nature of deficit, its 
promotion of dialogue (in place of deficit-oriented activities) and, perhaps most 
importantly, its coming to terms with values in the conduct of science and 
technology as a result of a wealth of STS research which forced driving values to 
be recognized in this way (McNeil 2007). Science and Society thereby formally 
marked the values-turn in UK public-science mediation policy (although ‘‘values 
in science’’ had been a longstanding theme in STS and here we see it as an STS 
‘‘truth-effect’’ in the Foucauldian sense (Foucault 2002)). The emphasis was no 
longer placed on public deficit with regard to scientific knowledge and 
understanding. Rather, Science and Society stresses a deficit of public ‘‘trust’’ in 
science and science policy, which it regards as only reasonable in light of the 
series of science-related scandals. To that extent, the deficit is located within the 
science scandals—their causes, effects and how they were handled by scientists, 
the media and policymakers. Another manifestation of deficit is framed around the 
lack of ‘‘dialogue’’, which is conceived as the missing two-way bridge between 
public values/opinions and the world of science and policy. Thus was deficit 
reframed to include scientists’ own inability to communicate their science in 
accessible, dialogical and engaging ways. To this extent, Science and Society was 
in a sense a manifesto for an ‘‘engagement’’ approach to PUS which is 
underpinned by a deliberative-democratic orientation. 
As a result, PEST became integral to three parallel processes: the substantive 
content of active citizenship as individuals’ participation in the democratic process 
requires the ability to come to reasoned/informed opinions about science-related 
issues; democratic sustainability and legitimacy for science; and, ultimately, 
creating the right conditions for the efficient conduct of science. The remedial 
response to this deficit in public trust thus centers around dialogue and dialogue- 
based work techniques, including national and local public consultations, polling, 
consultation panels, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, internet dialogues and 
foresight programmes (PSCST 2000). Dialogue between scientists, policymakers 
and the public, the Report argues, ought to take place earlier in scientific and 
policy processes, going so far as to suggest that, rather than one-off activities, 
dialogue events ought to be embraced as part of a cultural shift in the relation 
between science and society. Prefiguring the EU’s Report that appeared 7 years 
later (European Commission 2007), Science and Society placed an expectation on 
PEST to take on board value-based questions within an open two-way dialogical 
process that is not simply an after-the-event informative or even deliberative 
occasion but is coextensive with the process of scientific research. However, there 
is some ambiguity regarding the role of deliberation which gives away the 
underlying concern with securing propitious conditions for an efficient conduct of 
science, because dialogue will ‘‘help the decision-maker to listen to public values 
and concerns; and they give the public some assurance that their views are taken 
into account, increasing the chances that decisions will find acceptance’’ (PSCST 
2000). It is clear here that the efficiency imperative is getting the better of the 
democratic credentials in this statement: the aim is to create the procedures 
whereby, through listening, the decision-maker both reassures the ‘‘public’’ and 
gets their acceptance for something that has already been decided. In the same 
vein, it declares: ‘‘Our call for increased and integrated dialogue with the public is 
intended to secure science’s ‘licence to practice’, not to restrict it [original 
emphasis]’’. Clearly, deliberation here is cast in the mould of a consensus-building 
exercise. 
In terms of its pedagogic import, the new paradigm in public-science mediation 
seems to be in many ways a by-product of the shift in educational theories away 
from a didactic pedagogic mode built around the organizing oppositions of 
knowledge versus ignorance, classroom universal knowledge versus home 
context- dependent common sense, teacher versus learner, analysis versus 
narration, explanation versus utilitarian perception, etc. To a great extent echoing 
the impact of the belated discovery of Vygotsky, pedagogical and learning theories 
have sought to positively revalue common sense everyday experiences and 
knowledge as socially situated and continuous with classroom knowledge (expert 
knowledge relayed by expert transmitters), and thus offering the potential to be 
used as a platform for scaffolding more effective and inclusive learning 
experiences (Aikenhead 1996; Cunningham and Helms 1998; Kelly 2000; Snively 
and Consiglia 2001; Barton 2002). This pedagogic approach is framed in a 
constructivist language that clearly resonates with what had by then become an 
established paradigm within STS (Woolgar 1991; Michael 2002). 
While Science and Society remained the key UK policy document on public 
engagement between 2000 and 2010, government development of and financial 
commitment to PEST can be located in a number of documents that have appeared 
in the wake of Science and Society, with a range of implications. Public 
engagement appeared most explicitly in documents and projects directly 
concerned with government-led public engagement, with thematic foci around 
nanotechnology or genetically modified organisms, for example (The GM science 
review panel 2004; HM Government in consultation with the Devolved 
Administrations 2005), in ways that, while coherent in terms of delivering public 
dialogue in accordance with the overarching concepts of Science and Society, 
have been critiqued as instrumentalist, although this is exemplary of how 
contemporary science and society relationships are configured (Irwin 2006; 
Wynne 2006). Public engagement also features as a significant focus in several 
policy documents concerned with science funding, such as The Forward Look 
(OST 2003) and the Science and Innovation Investment Framework 2004–2014 
(HM Treasury and DIUS 2007), both of which present public engagement with 
science in terms of safeguarding and fostering innovation through promoting 
public trust in science, terms more akin to those found in the older PUS rationale. 
The link between science funding and public engagement is made more overtly by 
the Parliamentary Office for Science and Technology (POST) describing the 
concerns of public engagement as revolving around ‘‘[t]he science to be funded, 
how it should be carried out and how it should be used and regulated’’ (POST 
2006: 1). The presence of ‘‘public engagement’’ as a term in economically 
oriented policy documents, albeit a term prefacing attitudes similar to those found 
in the PUS movement, speaks to the increased salience of that term and related 
notions in the UK during the first decade of the 21st century. 
Two more recent government documents on the relationships between science and 
society in terms of public engagement have been the consultation document A 
Vision for Science and Society in 2008 and the Science for All report in early 
2010 (DIUS 2008; BIS 2010). In the first of these reports, the introduction from 
the then Minister of State for Science and Innovation, Ian Pearson, suggests that 
‘‘[s]cience and Society’’ used to be an area which was seen solely as a niche part 
of science communication. Today, we have no choice but to see it as a necessary 
condition for British—and global—success. (DIUS 2008: 4) 
In keeping with the themes of dialogue and engagement put forward in the 2000 
Report, A Vision for Science and Society recommends developing public 
engagement with science, highlighting the role for public consultation on science 
policy. However, emphasis is also placed on the importance of science innovation 
for the economy, the need to develop a scientific workforce and to improve the 
understanding of science across the population, rehearsing thereby the Bodmer 
Report and the series of scientific literacy arguments made during the Cold War 
period (Lehr 2007). This mixture of democratic, economic and educational 
arguments is taken up in Science for All, which followed the 2008 consultation. 
Although commissioned by DIUS, it was written by a non-governmental expert 
group comprising a number of PEST researchers and practitioners (BIS 2010). 
Unlike its predecessors, Science for All recognizes the multiplicity at play in the 
still emerging field of PEST, noting the many different actors, motivations, 
outcomes and publics involved and the potential for confusion in such a diverse 
setting. Instead of presenting a series of arguments for the value of science, and as 
a result of PEST, Science for All focuses on describing contemporary PEST 
concepts and practices, albeit with one telling acknowledgement in the 
introduction: 
In the current economic climate it is undoubtedly the case that the 
sciences and scientists need to demonstrate their case for continued 
public investment to Government and the wider public on economic 
and social groups as well as through their contribution to the growth 
of scientific knowledge itself. (BIS 2010: 6) 
Thus, through the various iterations of PEST concepts and purposes manifest in 
Government documents, increasing public dialogue around the governance of 
science is related at times to education, but repeatedly to the implicit value of 
democratic participation in science, and to increasing public confidence in science 
and thereby public support for science. 
The take-up of PEST ideas was also mirrored outside government by policy 
reports from learned societies. Scientific societies such as the Royal Society and 
the British Science Association (formerly the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science—BAAS) positioned PEST as an important part of 
democratically sound scientific practice and as a key tool for ensuring the mutual 
engagement of publics, scientists and policymakers (BA 2002; Royal Society 
2004). The Royal Society report Science and the Public Interest, building on the 
idea of PEST as key to the governance of science and in particular the funding of 
science, argued that privately funded as well as publicly funded scientific research 
ought to consider public interests and communication (Royal Society 2006). 
Despite the accordance of part of Science and the Public Interest with public 
participation in science, the Royal Society can also be seen as playing a part in 
what Fjaestad has described as the science lobby (Fjaestad 2007). The Report 
concludes that communicating with the public should become a key part of 
scientific training, but positions this as a critical device with which to forestall the 
creation of a regulatory body for the communication of scientific research, thus 
attempting to protect the autonomy of the scientific community in terms of 
engaging with publics (Royal Society 2006). The interplay of multiple actors, of 
which the government and scientific societies are but two stakeholders in a field of 
many more, is indicative of the overlapping and at times contradictory motivations 
pushing and pulling the development of PEST in the UK policy context. 
In addition to policy documents, further evidence for the sometimes problematic 
nature of PEST can be seen in the emergence of government dialogue practices. In 
order to pursue its public engagement objectives, the New Labour Government 
instituted a series of initiatives, notably the Sciencewise Expert Centre for Public 
Dialogue in Science and Innovation, funded by the Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills and the national Beacons for Public Engagement. The first 
seeks to have public dialogue events inform government policy whilst the second 
aims to engage publics with research carried out in Higher Education Institutions.3 
These initiatives are notable for their size and scale, involving considerable 
budgets and multiple institutions, and attempting to deliver PEST with measurable 
impacts on both policy and publics (RCUK 2008). Research suggests that, in 
attempting to deliver the dialogue, discussion and debate emphasized in Science 
and Society, projects such as Sciencewise, perhaps predictably, tend to reinforce 
the boundaries between different ‘‘publics’’, rather than engage these publics with 
science and science policy (Burchill 2007). And while little research about the 
impact of the Beacons exists as of yet, similar questions might be posed about the 
extent to which PEST practices, beneath the surface of declared intentions and 
visions, have surpassed PUS premises in a significant and substantive way. The 
proliferation of PEST activities outside those initiated and sponsored by the New 
Labour Government demonstrates how salient the language and concepts of PEST 
have become (Mesure 2007). Despite the considerable increase in forms of public 
engagement, the extent to which the scientists and policymakers involved in such 
events have developed conceptualizations of science and society relationships 
beyond those found in the PUS model is questionable (Burchill et al. 2009; 
Holliman et al. 2009). Additionally, while government support for some PEST 
initiatives is quite evident, a controversial report commissioned in 2007 to assess 
the effectiveness of governmental support for public engagement activities in UK 
science centres concluded there was insufficient evidence of the impact of science 
3 More information on Sciencewise can be found on: http://www.sciencewise-erc.org.uk/cms/; 
and on Beacons for Public Engagement: http://www.publicengagement.ac.uk/. 
 
centres to warrant public funding for such institutions (Frontier Economics 2009). 
Therefore, the landscape of PEST is still confusing at the present time, with the 
attitudes, policies and practices of the various players presenting a somewhat 
confusing mixture of motivations, justifications and objectives for their decisions 
and actions. 
Discussion 
Since the mid-1980s the gulf between the scientific establishment and the public 
of public opinion has come under governmental policy jurisdiction; it came to be 
viewed as something to be steered and regulated, rather than left to the 
unpredictable variables linked to discordant interested visions associated with 
scientists, science organizations, the media and pressure groups. Within the EU 
and the UK, there have been a number of largely STS-informed policy initiatives 
designed to encourage the emergence of new engagement-oriented science 
contexts, forums and events, in addition to some initiatives coming from 
individuals and civil-society organizations. The aim has been to induce grounded 
modes of mediation between public and science that can offset the communicative 
deficit of ‘‘received’’ science and its scientism, as well as depart from Bodmer-
type deficit- model approaches organized around restrictive assumptions about the 
public and the nature of science. This has ushered in what we here describe as the 
deliberative turn in modes of public-science mediation. 
The breadth of PEST practices includes a wide—and widening—range of 
activities and events. They include: public debates of varying scale, frequency and 
focus [the most famous of which in the UK is the GM Nation (Rowe et al. 2005)]; 
citizens’ juries or citizens’ conventions [happening at national and even cross- 
national levels, such as The Meeting of Minds (Goldschmidt and Renn 2006)]; 
science shops and cafe ́s scientifiques; science festivals (the major ones in the UK 
being organized in Manchester, Cheltenham, Glasgow, Oxford, Brighton, Bristol 
and the UK-wide festival organized by the British Science Associations); forums 
around outreach programmes organized by universities and laboratories in local 
schools and community centres; in addition to small-scale forums—often known 
as dialogue events—that take place within science museums and science centres 
(Pedretti 2004, 2007; Tlili et al. 2006; Bandelli et al. 2009). This presents us with 
a challenging spread of activities, modes of operating and delivery, and even 
divergent objectives. Not all activities can be said to be aimed to relay and enact 
deliberative democracy, even in the minimal formal sense of the term. In many 
PEST activities, the deliberative-democratic aspect or objective can get upstaged 
by other objectives: i.e., exclusively focusing on delivering information, 
entertainment and/or the building of social capital within and across local 
communities. Indeed, the events and activities that go by the name of PEST are 
distributed along a continuum of contrasting motivations, ranging from PUS-
oriented goals to those associated with deliberative democracy where dialogue is 
an end in and of itself (Trench 2008). The fluid and heterogeneous make-up of the 
PEST field, and the attendant difficulty to map and theorize it, are what Hagendijk 
and Irwin (2006) clearly show through a pan-European study of the deliberative 
mode of science governance. The concept of PEST seems to be constantly under 
construction and reconstruction. One explanation for the absence of a well-
bounded operational remit for PEST is that it is still in its early stages, still trying 
to carve out a distinct organizational identity, or at least distinctive functional and 
operational remit and set of parameters. However, there is a sense in which this 
blurry and inchoate shape could be valued as a positive sign of PEST’s 
accommodating capacity that can enable it to respond to the multiple expectations 
and objectives that follow from its unique position at the crosswords of several 
organizational fields—mainly informal science education, the democratic process 
and entertainment. This indeterminacy can also enable PEST to serve as an open-
ended space for creative experimentation with democracy. 
In fact, the extent to which a PEST activity can be said to partake of and feed into 
the deliberative democracy ethos depends, in the first instance, on how we 
conceive of deliberative democracy as a generic category, and how we conceive of 
deliberative democracy specifically in PEST. There can be multiple conceptions of 
what constitutes the sine qua non of an event that deserves or warrants the 
deliberative democracy classification. A number of differentiating criteria can be 
identified that can yield distinct conceptual configurations of what deliberative 
democracy can refer to: these include whether or not deliberation has a substantial 
impact on policymaking; whether the composition of the participants involves 
only so-called ‘‘lay’’ citizens or ‘‘lay’’ and ‘‘expert’’ participants; and whether 
numbers should matter in classifying an event as sufficiently ‘‘public’’. These are 
not self- evident criteria or measures; there remains the sticky question of how to 
construct criteria for these criteria, which entails a number of tributary questions 
such as: How substantial should ‘‘substantial’’ be when we talk about impact on 
policy/action? Who is the expert and who is the ‘‘lay’’ citizen, and what makes 
them so classified, and is the classification to reflect a difference in degree or in 
kind? The reification of the categories—in both senses of category—of ‘‘lay 
citizens’’ vs. ‘‘experts’’ is defeated in advance, simply because expertise is of 
necessity situated: it is best seen as a function of the problem or question at hand, 
especially given the high degree of differentiation of scientific knowledge. 
Stengers captures this contingent situated- ness of expertise when she notes: ‘‘Of 
course, the ‘public’ can’t intervene [as experts] in the question of whether the Big 
Bang is a fiction or a reality. But no more can non-specialist physicists’’ (2000: 
50). Another no less tricky conundrum pertains to the question of how 
representative these events are of the ‘‘public’’. For a deliberative-democratic 
PEST is bound to be haunted, both in practice and in theory, by the fact that, when 
all is said and done, those who take part in reasoned public deliberation, apart 
from everything else, will always be self-selected. These questions and concerns 
are bound to throw up some intractable empirical multiplicities in imagining the 
public (Collins and Evans 2002; Kerr et al. 2007). 
The next set of questions concern pedagogy (in the broad sense of pedagogy): how 
to ‘‘recontextualize’’—in Bernstein’s sense (2000)—science for deliberative 
democracy; how to build deliberative-democratic affordances around science; and 
what type of pedagogic philosophy should organize PEST enactments? In both the 
EU and the UK, attempts are being made to move public engagement with science 
beyond an after-the-event information-transmission model and onto a deliberative- 
democratic terrain. Soon after Science and Society 2000 was published, Miller 
(2001) highlighted the risk PEST practices would run in distancing themselves 
from the deficit model in an unqualified way: PEST practices might move too far 
from the knowledge base required to discuss scientific issues with an appropriate 
level of information, resulting in a sense of scientific expertise as taboo. It is 
important to note that science communication per se can be sidelined due to some 
overreaction against the information-transmission dimension whereby any flow of 
information from scientists to non-scientists, built around the inevitable opposition 
of knowledge/non-knowledge, tends to be dismissed as part of the passe ́ deficit-
based model, and in some sense as ‘‘politically incorrect’’. This has become in a 
sense an unreflexive de rigueur gesture: any activity that presupposes lack of 
knowledge or possible misconceptions on the part of the public, and thus aims to 
question or correct them or be in any way didactic, is to be avoided as a matter of 
course at any cost. The situation, we argue, is more complicated than the simple 
and neat opposition between a didactic deficit model and an empowering and 
benign engagement model. Rather than rush to brand and dismiss aspects of 
information- transmission as elitist and undemocratic, we need to start from the 
recognition that scientific knowledge is differentially and unequally distributed; 
this unequal distribution has nothing to do whatsoever with mental assets or 
deficits of those who know and those who do not know or know less (Norris 
1998). 
Ironically, the unqualified criticism of the transmission-model as necessarily 
bound up with a deficit-model outlook requires and depends upon an asocial 
image of knowledge production and acquisition. Continuing to refuse to recognize 
the unequal distribution of scientific knowledge by purging PEST of all traces of 
information-transmission will not of itself rectify the situation. Its only impact is 
an unhelpful censorship effect whereby we cease to talk about the unequal 
distribution of knowledge, without there being any change for the better as far as 
this inequality is concerned. Meanwhile, research on the relationships between 
experts and publics in PEST contexts has continued to explore the contextual, 
emergent and the continued privileged status of expert knowledge in PEST 
practices in ways that support elements of both the contextual and participatory 
PEST model and what is known as the deficit model (Collins and Evans 2002; 
Jasanoff 2003; Kerr et al. 2007). Thus, despite the overcompensation in some 
areas of PEST to distinguish engagement models from deficit models, the deficit 
model nonetheless often resurfaces as a significant element of how contemporary 
PEST is conceptualized and enacted, as recognized in the more nuanced PEST 
models mapped more recently (Trench 2008). A sense of unease with the total 
rejection of the deficit model was echoed repeatedly by a number of STS scholars 
who, while not rejecting the more participatory and contextual elements of the 
shift from PUS to PEST, have raised concerns about the need for information in 
personal and political decision- making processes, the role of expertise and a more 
complex model of how knowledge is created, distributed and used (Durodie 2003; 
Sturgis and Allum 2004; Wynne 2006). 
The now fashionable dismissal of any hint of information-transmission is 
presumably made in the name of the empowerment of the public, and the 
democratization of the relation between science and public: with science becoming 
modest and dialogical and the public becoming empowered, respected and heard. 
This is underpinned by the good intention of breaking with the negative 
assumptions about the public attributed to information-transmission models 
arrangements and objectives—assumptions derived from the knowledge/ignorance 
opposition. But what we need to recognize is that images of the public 
underpinning the putatively democratic, non-didactic philosophy rest on no less 
problematic assumptions about the public. If anything, they are more problematic 
in their most likely effects. This putatively democratic and empowering paradigm 
indeed contains many seeds of its own de(con)struction. Hostility towards the 
information-transmission model in the current paradigm of PEST is, at root and 
despite all appearances to the contrary, built around a crude opposition between 
experts and the public that, ironically, reinscribes a patronizing and devaluative 
view of the public. Unconditional dismissiveness of the transmission model 
reproduces the Platonic division of episteme and doxa. It works in such a way as 
to confine the ‘‘public’’ to a doxa- based and doxa-oriented role insofar as they are 
invited to voice their reactions and opinions without having to know or come to 
know anything about science, or anything they do not already know. This can 
happen via three possible ways of imagining the public which often come in 
mixed forms: 
(a) The public are assumed to know enough already and to be in no need of 
acquiring new knowledge; 
. (b)  They are not interested in knowing; they fare well with the everyday 
knowledge they already have by virtue of living in society as citizens (with 
citizenship understood in an essentialist and ahistorical sense of ‘‘ascriptive 
citizenship’’ (Smith 1997), citizenship as status tied to territory, and thus is 
in no need of a vibrant democratic process to cultivate it and facilitate its 
responsive situated enactments);  
. (c)  They should not be made to know, as this coming-to-knowing involves (a) 
knowing about one’s lack of knowledge in the first instance, which will be 
offensive; and (b) will set up science as a superior form of knowledge, and 
communicating science will amount necessarily to a didactic pedagogy that 
oppresses and devalues their vernacular knowledges. 
Whichever image(s) of the imagined public to be adopted, the fact remains that 
this take on the public boils down to a position that in effect perpetuates the status 
quo with regard to the distribution of knowledge insofar as it reinforces people’s 
exclusion from something they have already been excluded from. Further, it 
underestimates, even takes out of the equation altogether, ‘‘lay’’ people’s 
inquisitive drives as well as their concern about their own Bildung through 
interesting mediations of scientific knowledge. The ironic thing is that, based on a 
relativist STS-inspired outlook, the ‘‘lay’’ members of the public will not be 
missing out on anything really worth learning on the ground that science is itself 
only yet another ideology-laden worldview and form of knowledge as valid as any 
other, including their own vernacular forms of knowledge and opinions (the only 
difference being that scientific knowledge is powerful enough to have itself 
recognized and institutionalized as superior). A model of engagement purged of 
informal learning of science in the name of empowerment and democracy, it 
should be remembered, has not been established in a very democratic way. Nor is 
it democratic in terms of the way it affects ‘‘lay’’ people: they are presented with 
the forced choice of confining themselves to expressing their opinions and resting 
content with their doxa, without having to bother about anything else, especially 
not scientific knowledge and the complexities that arise from its applications. 
But this self-complacent position is good for neither democracy nor equality, nor 
indeed the pursuit of scientific knowledge. It is all too easy, and self-
congratulatory too, to ride ‘‘the spirit of the times’’, moralize about democracy 
and science, but leave the unequal distribution of scientific knowledge unthought 
and thus taken for granted. So, the first task is simply to depart from this self-
contradictory version of democratic egalitarianism brought to bear on public-
science mediation as a potential worksite of democracy. At a conceptual level, we 
need to proceed by postulating two axioms: inequality with regard to the 
distribution of knowledge; equality with regard to the ability as well as will to 
learn, reason and know. It is in Rancie`re’s work that we find the most forceful 
argument for the necessity of postulating equality as a point of departure, and the 
political, pragmatic but also empirical value of this organizing postulation. 
Equality, he argues, is ‘‘not an end to attain, but [ought to be] a point of departure, 
a supposition [original emphasis] to maintain in every circumstance based on the 
fact that the same intelligence is at work in all the productions of the human 
mind’’ (Rancie`re 1991: 18), hence his related idea of ‘‘the equality of 
intelligence’’. Rancie`re here is taking issue with Bourdieu’s and others’ 
sociological reproduction theories of education and culture. The point is that by 
taking inequality—rather than equality—as a presupposition to work from 
analytically and empirically, reproduction theories, he argues, have ended up 
reproducing the classifications that function in a prescriptive way and treat people 
as unwitting bearers of superior or inferior group mental and dispositional 
attributes predicated of their social positions. That all humans are equal with 
regard to ability and will to learn, reason and know is by no means to say that all 
opinions and understandings are of equal value because they emanate from the 
same pool of intelligence—equally distributed and non-discriminating. To 
collapse the egalitar- ian axiom of the equality of intelligences into an equality of 
all perspectives as culturally or subjectively contingent opinions would be a facile 
recipe for complacent and unreflexive feel-good egalitarianism, but with serious 
political and epistemological consequences. The fundamental flaw of the current 
ortho- doxy—reflected to a great extent in mainstream theory, practice and 
policy—that categorically condemns any attempt to transmit knowledge is that it 
collapses the two distinct axioms into some unhelpful self-defensive doctrine, 
assuming an imaginary equality of knowledge per se. Working from these two 
postulates— equality of intelligence; inequality of knowledge—will make it more 
likely to produce experimental and creative modes of PEST that are at once 
educational, informative, democratized and democratizing—democratizing with 
regard to both science policy and the modus operandi of the public sphere more 
broadly. 
On the other hand, more care should go into thinking the complex relations 
between science and democracy, in fact between various possible versions of 
science and various formats of democracy. Relationships between science and 
democracy have been a subject of interest for those re-imagining a more 
democratic science, from a philosophical rather than public engagement 
perspective (Kitcher 2001; Longino 1990). The relations are not as straightforward 
and as happy as they are often assumed to be—ones of complementarity and 
mutual predication—and if they clash, then the clash is explained simply through 
either scientists’ non- democratic peer-oriented ways and/or the deficit of 
organizational arrangements for upstream democratization of science. In other 
words, inevitable hitches are constantly explained by the lack of fit between 
principle and reality, not by unpacking and scrutinizing the principle itself and its 
limits and internal tensions. This, at base, follows from collapsing different 
‘‘value-spheres’’ into an undiffer- entiated bloc of values, all the while taking no 
account of the epistemic values of science that are always in excess of the values 
of scientists, even the most successful and ingenuous amongst them. Which points 
to another problem in some simplistic STS-inspired approaches to engagement: a 
humanist reduction of science to the subjectivities of scientists who are presented 
in too modernist a light to square with the professed postmodernist credentials of 
the recent waves of STS (its crude modernism consisting of the ultimate reference 
of all that occurs in science to a grounding cynical subject). Scientists are framed 
as self-conscious and constituent subjects whose conscious, self-interested agency 
is all that matters to understand how science is produced and the truth-value of 
science per se. This is rooted in an unacknowledged transposition of the modernist 
subject in its classical-liberal version. 
What seems to be least helpful for a constructive and challenging PEST is this 
constant axiological adequation between democracy (as self-governance), justice 
(as the name for equality of citizens’ access to scientific resources and recognition 
of their ability to contribute to the conduct of science) and science (as 
propositional knowledge with present-best truth-values, or at least present-best 
‘‘truth-tracking’’ values (Norris 2005)). In essence, this view has little purchase on 
the intrinsic discordances between knowledge, democracy and social justice, their 
respective norms, enactments and uses which, whilst they might overlap 
empirically in some cases, remain irreducibly heterogeneous to each other. Badiou 
very nicely captures this tension when he says: ‘‘It’s certainly true that voting has 
little to do with truth. If our knowledge of planetary motion relied solely on 
suffrage as its protocol of legitimation, we would still inhabit a geocentric 
universe’’ (2006: 15). By the same token, it was hardly through some popular vote 
or democratic consensus that evolutionary theory has established its truth 
credentials and its foundational role for subsequent developments in various 
branches of biology, medicine and genetics. In other words, and paradoxically, the 
democratic means is inadequate to the task of adjudicating over the goodness of 
opinions with regard to their truth-value (or truth- tracking value for that matter). 
In a sense, developing scientific knowledge proceeds through what can be 
described as undemocratic eruptions, torsions, displacements and negations—what 
Badiou would describe as acts of ‘‘creative violence’’ that stand beyond the 
moralizing and indeed irrelevant dichotomy of good and evil. 
Strategies have been developed, theorized, enacted and revised for assisting with 
the development of a more participatory science (Jasanoff 2003; Wilsdon and 
Willis 2004; Rowe et al. 2005; Felt and Fochler 2008). Despite the many attempts 
to reconcile various visions of science, participatory democracy and public 
engage- ment, what does not seem to be sufficiently recognized is that science and 
democracy belong in two competing value-spheres whose relation is, at best, one 
of mutual indifference, and at worst, one of outright conflict that can throw up 
some tricky dilemmas. We hardly need to reiterate one or two of the many classic 
examples of this conflict (Collins and Evans 2002), reminiscent in many ways of 
Kant’s antinomies of reason—in our case democratic reason pitted against 
scientific reason. What are we to do if, in the name of democracy in its established 
majoritarian form (whose legitimacy is rooted in popular suffrage and 
sovereignty), we were to oppose the pursuit of a given research programme based 
on their democratically negotiated but non-scientific or science-irrelevant 
considerations? Perhaps this tension between the nature of knowledge and 
democratic participation can explain to a certain extent the resistance of the deficit 
model and its continued presence in the wide spectrum of contemporary PEST 
concepts and practices noted by several researchers (Trench 2008; Burchill et al. 
2009). 
The aporias and complex implications—practical and conceptual—that arise from 
the marriage of democracy and science have received little attention in policies 
and theories of deliberation in science governance (Nelkin 1977: Jasanoff 2005; 
Nowotny et al. 2001, 2003; Jasanoff 2003; Lengwiler 2008; Stirling 2008). In 
parallel, it is not very helpful to posit democracy as a normed ideal that is pre- 
established in its final shape, against which PEST activities can be judged and 
measured. Democracy should be seen as a creative practice, always in excess of its 
a priori normative determinations. The role of the democratic space in relation to 
science should be approached as at once an educational opportunity without a 
predetermined educational outcome, an interruption of science by non-scientific 
means on the ground of the sociality of the effects of science—as opposed to its 
conduct—and as ‘‘a partition of the sensible’’, in Rancie`re’s sense, i.e., a 
disruption of the consensual model of democracy as expression of that which is 
given in one’s social identity/location coordinates. The challenge with regard to 
science is not less science and more culture as some fashionable STS-inspired 
views seem to suggest; it is more science in spite of and precisely because of the 
encroachment of the cultural into the scientific. 
Given the degree of incommsensurability and, in a sense, mutual indifference 
between democracy and science, essentially between the organizing axioms 
immanent to each, it is all the more important to see the coupling of democracy 
and science as an artifice that needs to be creatively thought out and designed. 
Democracy as creative experimental praxis does not have to, and arguably should 
not, be oriented towards consensus, as Habermas’s normative expectation goes, 
and as is the general drift of current engagement events (Irwin 2006), because 
dissensus can have even more value in cultivating a sense of civic engagement and 
freeing democracy from the existing consensual model of opinion management 
(Rancie`re 2004, 2010). In any case, consensus is a very rare currency even among 
scientists, and arguably is neither empirically feasible nor even desirable; and 
should not in any case be taken as the end-goal of PEST; consensus and consensus 
management are of the order of what Negri (2009) calls ‘‘constituted power’’; 
dissensus is what can feed into ‘‘constituent power’’. The ability to think for 
oneself, and to think otherwise about science and science-related issues within the 
void created by macro majoritarian politics, is far more worthwhile. Disrupting the 
established doxa is in itself a very worthwhile goal; and that applies as much to 
scientists’ opinions— which should be analytically distinguishable from their 
science—as to the non- scientists’ opinions. We would do well to see and 
approach deliberative democracy in PEST as a creative struggle against the weight 
of spontaneous, self-interested and pre-given doxa of scientists and non-scientists 
alike. 
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